The examples in (1) illustrate a phenomenon that has attracted considerable theoretical attention ever since the era in which a transformation known as EQUI(valent NP Deletion) was supposed to have deleted the underlying subject of the embedded phrase (Rosenbaum 1967 (Rosenbaum , 1970 .
(1) a.
Sami hopes [�i to be invited to the party] b.
My wife thinks Ii want [0i to feed the ldds] c.
The candidatei promised the voters [0i to reduce the deficit]
d.
Sam forced Jackj [0i to eat the pizza ]
Two imponant features of this phenomenon (in English), hencefonh COMPLEMENT CONTROL, are (i) that a nonfinite predicative phrase functioning as a complement of a lexical head does not have a subject overtly expressed internall y. and (ti) that a spe.
cific argument of the lexical head of which the predicative phrase is a complement is necessarily interpreted as the latter'S subject Thus. where .�' in these examples represents the phonologically unexpressed subject argument of the bracketed phrase,l the only interpretation available is one in which this argument is coreferen tial with the NP marked in these examples with the same index. which is said to be the CONTROlLER.
This paper is concerned with the nature of the principles that ensure the cor rect choice of controller. Based on the observation that in cases where there is a potential choice the nonsubject is generally chosen (as in (ld». one proposal has bee n a MINIMAL DISTANCE PRINCIPLE (Rosenbaum 1970 , Chomsky 1980 . Larson 1991 , according to which the syntacticall y closest NP is chosen. 2 Due in part to the fact that obvious manipulations of syntactic position do not aff ect controller choice, as ill ustrated for example by comparing (ld) with (2a) or (2b) with (2c), various thematic. semantic, and/or pragmatic alternatives to a syntactically based condition have been explored (for example. lackendoff 1972 . 1990 . Comrie 1984 , Foley & Van Valin 1984 , Farkas 1988 , Sag & Pollard 1991 .
1 In most GB analyses controlled complements are clauses wilh an empty NP subject -either the [+anaphoric) PRO (for example. Chomsky 1981 . Manzini 1983 or some other variety of null pronoun (Huang 1989 . Borer 1989 . An alternative approach is to analyze controlled complements (at the phrase sttucture level) as internall y subjectless phrases whose subject is interpreted as one (2) a. Jacki was forced by Sam [flSi to eat the pizza] b. The candidatei made the people a promise [flSi to reduce the deficit] c.
The people got from the candidatei a promise [flSi to reduce the deficit]
More or less independently of the question of whether non-syntactic factors influence controller choice. an enduring idea has been that some kind of a syntactic COMMAND constraint limits the range of potential controllers in some important way. In Larson's approach, for example, minimal distance is defined in terms of the na tion 'c-command' (Reinhart 1976) . Others have pmsued the idea that the unex pressed subject of the controlled complement is an anaphor in the sense of the binding theory, and as such must (at least under certain conditions) be locally bound, and hence locally commanded. by its controller. This approach is adopted both in certain Government-Binding theory (GB) analyses, in which binding is de fIned in terms of c-command (for example . Manzini 1983 . Koster 1984 , Borer 1989 and in the Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG) analysis of Sag and Pollard 1991 (hencefonh S&P), in which binding is defined in terms of the na tion 'o-command'.
The main goals of this paper are to argue that a syntactic command constraint on complement control is neither necessary nor desirable and to show that apparent evidence for such a constraint is bener handled otherwise. After presenting in §2 a lexical semantic analysis of controller choice that ties together in a somewhat novel way certain ideas from various sources. in §3 I consider obstacles to a c-command condition on complement control that the proposed analysis overcomes and in §4 I show that, although less problematic than its c-command based analogs. the HPSG binding-theoretic analysis proposed by S&P fails to account satisfactorily for the main problems for which it was intended, i.e., the impossibility of passivized sub ject controller verbs eVisser's generalization ') and the fact that the thematically ex pected controller is sometimes not chosen with predicates such as promise (the 'controller shift' problem). I present alternative. more adequate solution s to both of these problems, in which syntactic command plays no role.
A lexical semantic approach to controller choice
The approach to the question of controller choice I take is based on three main ideas. First. following the general son of analysis advocated in Williams 1987 Williams , 1989 , the formal mechanism of control involves binding of arguments at the level of ARGUMENT STRUCTURE (AS). i.e., the level at which gramma tically relevant dis tinctions between the semantic arguments of a predicate are represented in struc tured 'theta-grids' ( Foley and Van Valin 1984) . control predicates can be divided into lexical semantic classes based on which rules for controller choice can be stated in terms of thematic relations. Third. under the assumption that thematic relations ('agent ', 'patient', 'theme', etc.) are convenient labels for cenain kinds of relational configurations at the level of (lexical) CONC£PrUAL STRUCTURE (CS) (Hale 1983 , lackendoff 1987 , 1990 , Rappaport and Levin 1988 , Pinker 1989 . the control rules might look directly to fearures of the CS of the controlling predicates.
As Under the assumption that the main control principle has the effect of ensuring that the subject of the controlled complement be coindexed with another argument of the predicate of which it is itself an argument, nothing further needs to be said about predicates of orientation. since other than their complement clause, they have only an experiencer argument. 3 Only with predicates of influence and certain predicates of commitment does a potential choice of controllers arise. A schematic lexical entry for predicates of influence such as fo rce and convince is plausibly as in (4), following in essence lackendoff's (1990) analysis of the CS offorce.4 (4) AS:
CS:
Some predica1eS in the orienwion class appear in strIlCtures which mi g ht suggest that there is a potential choice of controllers (for example, I want my wife to fe ed the kids and For me. this book will be easy to read). I assume that in both cases the non-experiencer NP is not a semantic argwnent of the main clause predicate. as in the raising-to-<.lbjecl and tou.gh movement analyses of classical transformational grammar. In the want type case, there is no control; in the easy type case, there is control -but the experiencer is the only argument of easy (other than the comple ment clause) and thus the only potential controller.
4
Throu g bout the paper. I use CS representations of the sort found in Jaclcendoff 1990, simpli fied in certain ways. Specifically, I do not distinguish the various varieties of CAUSE and AFFE CT predica1:eS that need to be recognized. Moreover, I simply represent variable arguments, corresponding for example to elements of type TIiING, with lower case Roman leuers ([xl) and supp ress indexing as a way of showing correspo ndences, letting choice of letter do the job.
What seems to matter is that the controller, the object NP in an active clause or the direct internal argument, is the influenced or acted on participant. Stated directly in terms of the CS representation. the controller is the second argument of AFFE C'f. which in Jackendoff's system is a predicate on the action tier, where the actor/acted on concepwal distinction (in various manifestations) is encoded.
In the case of predicates of expression of commitment that may optionally ap pear in a structure with an oven addressee (such as promise and vow), the con troller is the acting participant, as shown in (lc) for example. The lexical entry for such predicates is plausibly as in (5).
(5)
AS:
The key difference between predicates of influence and predicates of commitment is that the internal argument of the latter is riot necessarily conceived of as being fun damentally affected by the action, a fa ct that manifests itself in the contrasting be havior of the two types of predicate with respect to the pseudocleft do to test of af fec tedness (Jackendoff 1990) , as illustrated by the following examples.
(6) a. * What I did to those guys was tell them my name b.
What I did to those guys was kick them (I) a. What I did to those guys was force them to finish the job b. * What I did to those guys was promise them to finish the job The contrast between (7a) and (7b). like that between (6a) and (6b). is attributable to the fact that an addr essee is not conceived of as being necessarily influenced by the action denoted by the predicate . The absence of a second argument of AFFE C'f in the CS in (5) expresses this intuition.
In essence, a thematic principle of controller choice needs to say that in case there is a potential choice of controllers. the influenced panicipant is chosen, if there is one, otherwise the acting participant. The overall control theory contemplated here is summed up in the following principles.
(8) a. The EVENT argument of an XO A denoting a relation of INFLUENCE, COMMITMENT, or ORIENTATION may/must be expressed as a predicative phrase (= CONTROLLED COMPLEMENT), whose subject is necessarily coin dexed with another argument of A (;; CONTROlLER) . 5 b. If the CS of an XO A with a controlled complement C contains [AFFECT (a.. �)], the controller of C is the argument of A that corre sponds to �, if � is not null ; otherwise it is a..
5
For languages like English, it would further have to be specified that the controlled comple ment is nonfinite and without oven subject. features of the phenomenon that appear to vary cross·linguistically (see Borer 1989) . Presumably, the precise range of semantically compatible predicates that allow and/or require control varies cross-linguistically as well.
(9) illustrates the effects of (8) 
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The direct internal argument offorce. argument y in the AS, is coindexed with the phonologicall y unexpressed subject argument of eat, p in the AS, by virtue of the fact that some argument of fo rce must be coindexed with the subject of eat by (8a) and this argument must corr espond to the second argument on the action tier in the es of fo rce by (8b). In the case of control predicates such as promise, the exter nalIactor argmnent is chosen as controller, since it corre sponds to the only argument on the action tier in the CS. With control predicates of orientation, the experiencer argument is chosen because it is the only possible choice, whether or not there is an action tier in the CS of such predicates.
3. Obstacles to a c .. command constraint A central claim of the approach to control theory sketched above is that although reference to the notion 'subject' is required for identification of the con trolled argument, position in phrase stIUcture is irr elevant to controller choice. As noted above, this claim differentiates this approach from that taken in standard GB binding-theoretic accounts of control and accounts based on a Minimal Distance Principle. Binding-theoretic accounts claim that the unexpressed subject of a con trolled complement is an anaphor, which must be bound (i.e., coindexed with a c-commanding NP) in a local domain. The notion 'local domain' is defined in such a way as to ensure that the binder be found within the minimal clause containing the controlled complement. Thus, the locality effect of (8a) (but not the effect of (8b) , is attributed to binding theory. The Minimal Distance Principle approach, as re cently revived in Larson 1991. attempts to achieve both the effects of (8b) and the locality effect of (8a) by requiring that the subject of a controlled complement be bound by the closest c-commanding NP. Since the notion 'c-command' (generally defined as in (10) plays a crucial role in both of these approac hes. they constitute viable alternatives to the approach advocated here only if there is in fact a general ization concerning possible controllers that employs this notion.
(10) C -command: X c-commands Y iff the minimal maximal projection dominat ing X dominates Y. (Manzini 1983) I maintain that there is no such generalization, for various reasons.
To begin with S&P point out that the controller may, under certain conditions, be expressed in a sentence in a discourse that is distinct from that in which the con trolled complement occ urs, as illustrated by the following examples. (11) a. Jack persuaded SaJIli of something. I don't remember exactly what, but I think it was [0; to fix his car] b.
The candidate made an appeal to the voterst. It was [0; to vote for change]
Since c-command is a relation among elements dominated by some common S node, it is unclear how a local c-comman d condition on control could be made con sistent with examples such as these. The lexical semantic analysis, by contrast, provides a straightforward account. The bracketed infinitival phrases express se mantic arguments of the syntactically remote predicates (persuade in (I ta) and appeal in (1 1 b» . The control principles hold for these predicative phrases just as they do for those expressed in the more typical syntacticall y governed position.
A second problem is that the contrOller can be expressed within various kinds of phrases that limit its c-command domain in such a way as to preclude syntactic binding of the controlled complement's subject, as in the following examples. in which the c-command domain of the controller is indicated by angled brackets. 6
(12) a. b. c. (13) a. Although it is possible that certain of these cases might be amenable to some kind of analysis that would all ow a c-command constraint to be maintained,? it is unclear 6 (12a-b) ill ustrale a kind of infinitival phrase in extraposed position that appears to differ from the kind discussed by S&P (as in It would bother me to have to do that). Unlike in the latter case, in the case of (1 2a-b), control by the experiencer argument is obligatOry, whether or not the com· plement is in the extraposed position, as can be see n from the ungrarnmaticality of ·Tom knew that to cut hirme/f would never occur to Jane/it would never occur I/) Jane to cut himself. whether a non-ad-hoc solution is av ailable. In at least the case of (13b-c), there do not seem to be even remotely plausible alternatives that are consistent with a c-command constraint. One might claim that the controller is a c-commanding null pronoun, rather than the apparent controller expressed in the adjunct phrase. However, a structure with a null pronoun should be ruled out for the same reason as one with an overt pronoun, as in the examples in (14) (presumably as a violation of Principle C of the binding theory). (14) It should be clear that the kind of control ill ustrated by (13b--c) is unproblematic un der the approach adopted here. The NPs indicated as controllers must by vinue of the meanings of the constructions be understood as the promiser in (13b) and the attempter in (l3c); the control principles in (8) ensure that the promiser argument of promise and the attempter argument of att empt be interpreted as the controllers. in dependently of how (or indeed if) they happen to be syntactically expressed. These principles provide a similarly straightforward account of the other cases illustrated by the examples in (12) and (13), since in every case the controller is the semanti cally appropriate argument of the predicate of which the infinitival phrase expresses the event argument. Finally, as has been noted elsewhere (Williams 1985 . Jackendoff 1990 . p. 67), controllers in certain constructions need not be syntactically expressed at all . Consider, for example, sentences such as the following, in which the unexpressed subject of the complement clause is necessarily understcxxl as being the same as the implicit argument of the governing noun or adjective. (15) In these kinds of structures, the subject of the controlled complement is naturall y given a so-call ed 'arbitrary' interpretation, i.e., is interpreted as having an unspeci fied human referent. If so, the same interpretation is necessarily given to the implicit argument that the semantic control principles designate as controller. It is also pos sible for the controlled subject to be interpreted as having the index of a remote oven NP, in which case the expected controller must be interpreted in the same way. In (15a), for example, the robber may be understood as being Jack; if so, Jack is necessarily understcxxl as being the attempter as well. The idea that c-command is necessary for control can apparently be main tained in the light of examples such as these only at the expense of introducing with oven anaphor binding as well, as in I spoke to the men about each other. To my knowledge, this problem for a c-command based binding theory remains Wlsolved.
some kind of otherwise unmotivated enrichment of syntactic representations or complication of the definition of c-command. 8 Under the analysis adopted here, on the other hand, implicit arguments of the son under consideration are simply argu ments that axe present in AS but not in phrase-markers. For example. the structure of the relevant portion of (15c) would be as follows.9 
NP N'
Tlte r------
Since complement control involves AS binding, the fact that arguments need not be projected in phrase-markers under certain circumstances (quite generally in nomi nals, for example) does not affect the indexing procedure. By way of conclusion. the generalization concerning complement control is that the controller must be a specific argumen t of a lexical head of which the con trolled phrase is interpreted as the event argument, as expressed in the complement control principles in (8). It is true that in many cases this relationship coincides with local c-comman d between an NP expressing the controller and the controlled com plement. However. as there are also various cases in which an analysis involving c-command is apparently not available, a condition on complement control fOIDlu lated in terms of c-comman d misses the generalizati on.
The irrelevance of o-comman d for control

HPSG binding theory and complement control
As noted above, the control principles in (8) are inspired in large pan by the analysis of complement control proposed by Sag and Pollard (1981 =S&P) . Certain details of expression aside, the main difference between the analysis advocated here and the S&P analysis is that the latter includes -in addition to a set of similar se mantically-based control principles -the assumption that the unexpressed subject of a controlled complement is an anaphor that is subject to the principles of HPSG Grimshaw 1990. binding theory. Unlike in the GB version of binding theory, these principles are form ulated in terms of local O-COM.MAND, a structural relation between elements on a SUBCAT list, which is essentially a representation of syntactic argument structure in which the elements that a predicate is in syntactic construction with are ordered according to relative obliqueness. The key idea is that less oblique elements unilat erally o-command more oblique ones -where subjects are less oblique than direct objects, which are less oblique than PPs, etc. -and precedence on a SUBCAT list correJates with less obliqueness and, at least generally in English, with linear prece dence. The HPSG view of the p ortion of binding theory of imm ediate relevance is expressed in (17) and (18) The subject of cut locall y o-commands the object anaphor, as there is a SUBCA T list on which the former, which is referential, precedes the latter. Since this anaphor is locall y o-commanded, it must be locally o-bound, i.e., coindexed with a locall y o-commanding element. Being coindexed with the subject, it is locally o-bound; binding theory is satisfied. Consider now the ungramma ticality of (20a). The anaphoric PP about herself is locally o-commanded by the possessive NP Jack. since this NP is referential and it precedes about herself on the SUBCA T list of comment, as shown in (20b). About herself. which -being locally o-commanded -must be locall y o-bound, is coindexed not with Jack but with the senator, an NP which does not locall y o-command it; by virtue of the fact that there is no SUBCA T list on which the two elements both appear. Since herself is not coindexed with a locally o-commandin g element, Principle A is violated.
All that is needed to extend HPSG binding theory to complement contIUl is (i) the assumption that the unexpressed subject of the controlled complement is an anaphor. and (li) a definition of local o-command such that this anaphor is locally o-commanded as if it were on the SUBCAT list of the predicate whose argument is the controller, which is the effect of (17b). Controlled complement phrases are as sumed to be VPs which, like VPs in general, subcategorize for a subject NP. By (17b), the subject of a complement VP is locally o-commanded by whatever locally o-commands that VP. Thus, in (21a), for example, the subjeCt anaphor that the VP to eat the pizza subcategorizes for is locall y o-commanded by Jack and Sam, since these NPs precede the VP in question on the SUBCAT list offorce, as shown in (2 1 b) . (21) In the case of (22a), the unexpressed subject of the bracketed VP is not locally o-commanded by any element, under the assumption that the subject of was is an expletive pronoun, i.e., a pronoun whose content is not a referential parameter, and thus not a potential o-commander. In the case of (22b), the anaphor subject of the embedd ed VP is also not o-commanded, since the only other element on the SUBCAT list of attempt, being a determiner, is not a potential o-commander. As the implicit anaphors are exempt from any binding requirement, the coindexing shown is guaranteed solely by the semantic control principles. This approach is not without problems, however. To begin with it encounters imm ediate obstacles with examples such .as (13a) and (1Sc), repeated here as (23a) and (24a) respectively. The unexpressed subject of the embedded VP in (23a) is locally o-commanded only by the president's only hope , but is coindexed with another NP. Although the se mantic control principles are satisfied, binding theory apparently is not. Similarly, in (23b), the controller is the implicit influenced argument of order rather than the expressed actor argument, which is the only apparent o-cotrimander of the embed ded anaphor.
One might justifiably wonder why any attempt should be made to extend the principles of binding theory to complement control, given the independent need for a set of principles along the lines of those in (8). There are two classic problems for conttol theory that ostensibly motivate such an attempt within the overall S&P ap proach. I believe, however, that the proposed solutions to these problems ultimately fail and that there are more satisfying solutions that do not involve a local o-command condition.
Visser's generalizati on
Under the assumption that passive by phrases do not precede VP comple ments on SUBCA T lists, the HPSO binding-theoretic analysis of control provides a potential solution to the problem illustrated by the ungramma ticality of (25a). an in stantiation of so-call ed Visser's generalization. 
[SUBCAT <NP, VP [SUBCAT <NP:anai>], PP[by l i>]
The VP and its unexpressed subject anaphor are locall y o-commanded by only the subject of be promised. They are not locally o-commanded by the optional by phrase, as it is more oblique. Neither are they locally o-commanded by the implicit promiser argument (in the case of a short passive), because it is either not on the SUBCAT list or, if analyzed as a null pronoun, is also more oblique. Since the se mantic control principles require that the promiser be the controller, the controlled anaphor cannot be bound by its unique local o-commander. The ungramma ticality of (25a) is due to a Principle A violation.
Attractive though this sort of explanation may appear to be, there are at least two shortcomings with it. To begin with, there is no basis for the assumption that passive by phrases are necessarily more oblique than controlled complements. Examples such as (26a) show that a by phrase, when sanctioned, would normally precede a controlled complement, as would be expected if it were less oblique. This letter was apparently sent by the president to himself Furthermore, PPs expressing semantic arguments of predicates nonnally can be controllers, as ill ustrated by (26b-c). Thus, PPs, in general, are less oblique than VP complements, under the assumption that obliqueness is relevant to control and anaphor binding in the way that HPSG binding theory claims. (26d-e) show that passive by phrases may precede and locally o-bind overt VP-internal reflexives, which entails that by phrases may be less oblique than other PPs (including, for ex ample, complement to phrases). Independently of (2Sa). it would seem that one would have to conclude that by phrases are (or at least may be) less oblique than to phrases, which are less oblique than VP complements, in view of which the claim that by phrases are necessarily more oblique than VP complements is apparently false.
A second problem arises with respect to examples such as those in (27 ) Ideall y, the explanation for the ungramma ticality of (25a) should extend to the ex amples in (27), which appear to be bad in precisely the same way. However, the S&P account of (25a) as a Principle A violation leaves (27) unexplained. Since the logical subject of verbs like be hoped, whether overtly expressed in a by phrase or not. is not a local o-commander of the VP complement and its anaphor subject, and the superficial subject of such verbs is not a local o-commander by virtue of the fact that it is an expletive pronoun, the anaphor should be exempt from any binding re quirement and should be able to be freely coindexed with the argument specified by the semantic control principles. The alternative that I propose is that the ill-formedness of both (25a) and (27) is attributable to an analysis of passive (following Bresnan & Moshi 1990) ac cording to which the external argument is suppressed at the level of AS, in con junction with the assumption that suppressed arguments are not visible for comple ment control.IO The optional by phrase in a passive clause is a kind of adjunct, The effect of passivization on promise is to suppress in the AS the argument corre sponding to the conceptual actor. Since tJ;rls argument must be the controller by the semantic control principles in (8) but is suppressed, control fails -whence the un grammati cality of (25a). The same explanation holds for the ill-formedness of the examples in (27). Impersonal passivization of verbs such as Iwpe would involve suppressing the only potential controller. By contrast, control is possible with pas sivized persuade and suggest (see (26a) and (29b» , for example. because the con troller is not suppressed.
The important point here is that the facts having to do with Visser's general ization do not motivate an o-command constraint on complement control, since there is a reasonable alternative account of these facts that is both more comprehen sive and more clearly technicall y viable.
Controller shift
Another kind of apparent motivation for an o-command based bind ing-theoretic analysis of control is that it makes possible a resolution of a paradox that arises in coMection with S&P's proposed solution to the problem posed by ex amples such as (3 1), which shows that under certain circumstances the actor argu ment of predicates such as promise need not be the controller (indeed there is something of a preference for a shift to object control in such cases), in apparent violation of the semantic control principles.
(3 1) Jack thinks that Ij promised the kidsi [�ilj to be all owed to watch TV] Briefly, the paradox is that one of the arguments of promise must be the controller (it cannot be Jack, for example); but the factor that is taken to all ow controller shift eat). The ass mnption that suppres sed arguments are not visible for complement control, which can be easily incorporated into principle (Sa), also buys an account of the well-known fact that object deletion sysrematicall y fails with Object controller verbs (Bach 1979) . This approa ch of course re� quires analyzing the implicit argument phenomenon discussed above as being distinct from argu ment suppression.
effectively exempts the subject of the infinitive from the semantic control principles that might otherwise guarantee a specific controller. Principle A of the binding theory provides a solution in that it requires that the embedded subject be locally bound independently of semantic controller choice.
In a nutshell, the problem with this line of reasoning is that the factor respon sible for controller shift is not corr ectly identified. There is an alternative analysis according to which the possibility of object control follows directly from the se mantic control principles and given which the paradox for which Principle A is in voked dissolves. This alternative analysis is preferable. moreover, in that it is con sistent with a wider range of facts.
Let us consider in somewhat more detail S&p's analysis of examples such as (3 1). The main idea is that what makes controller shift possible is an independently occmring phenomenon they call 'causative coercion '. Causative coercion is sup posed to make possible, for example, imperatives based on stative and passive verbs, whose superficial subject is not sufficiently agentive to otherwise allow im perative formation (Be optimistic! , Be happy!, Be noticed! , for example). Given the observation that Be optimistic! means something like 'Make yourself optimistic! ' , S&P propose that causative coercion is a lexical process by which a stative or pas sive verb is essentially transformed into a causative one. This process is conceived of as involving addition of an 'interpolated' causative (i-cause) relation in the se mantic content of the verbs in question, with no effect on SUBCA T lists and asso ciated phrase structures. Thus, embedding a be allowed type VP with an i-cause relation under promise would yield an analysis such as is shown in (32), where the semantic content is represented as the bracketed material on the right (certain repre sentational details are omitted or simplified; SOA = state of affairs argument).
proIDlsed � e .6. kids to be allowed ...
S&P's semantic control principles require that. as shown in (32), the comminor participant in the promise relation be coindexed with the 'external ' argument of the i-cause relation (which is the influencer participant) and that the influenced partici pant in the i-cause relation be coindexed with the influenced participant in the all ow relation (by virtue of the fact that the latter is, on their analysis, the • external' argu ment of passivized allow) .l1 Importantly, the semantic control principles do not re quire that the influenced participant in the i-cause relation be coindexed with either of the participants in the promise relation, or for that matter, with anything other than the influenced participant in the allow relation, the net effect of which is that the unexpressed subject of to be allowed (together with the necessarily covert influ enced argument of i-cause) may bear any index, as far as the semantic control prin ciples are concerned. However. since the unexpressed subject of to be allowed is an anaphor that is locally o-commanded by the NPs corresponding to the participants in the promise relation, it must be bound by one of these. Thus, Principle A of the binding theory, and this principle alone, ensures that one of the NPs on the SUBCA T list of promise be coindexed with the unexpressed subject of 10 be allowed.
As I see it, there are two problems with this general approach to the controller shift problem. First, to the extent that causative coercion is an independently identi fiable phenomenon, it must be said to apply to a wide range of stative and passive predicates, including, for example, all those that allow imperative formation. The prediction seems to be that controller shift should be possible in cases such as the following.
(33) a.
b.
Ii promised the kidsj [fc'iI*j to be optimistic] Ii promised the kids j [fc'i/*j to be happy]
Since examples such as these are good with a subject controller, and there is some kind of agentive or causative restriction on the content of the controlled complement (as evidenced by the oddn ess of 111 promised the kids to be tall/to know the answer/to concern their mother) , it would seem that causative coercion would have to be allowed with them under the S&P approach. If so, it is far from clear what would prevent object control . In fa� the controller shift phenomenon with promise is apparently quite limited, being possible only with constructions that express some kind of subject potentiation, as in the examples in (34).
(34) I promised the kidsi [fc'i to be able/permittedlallowed to watch TV]
This limitation is completely mysterious under the causative coercion analysis. A second, more serious problem with the analysis is that it fai ls to account for controller shift within nominals with an implicit argument, as can be seen by con sidering the following example.
11 More specificall y, S&p's control principles require that the external argument (= roughly ar gument that would be the smface subject if expressed ) of the SOA in a relation of type commit ment.. influence, or orientation be coindexed with the commiuor. influenced, or experiencer partici pant in this relation. In this case, as in (31), the unexpressed. subject of the infinitive must be understood as being the same as one of the semantic arguments of promise� i.e., either Max or, preferably, the implicit recipient argument, which is understood to be the kids by virtue of the overall meaning of the sentence. However, as can be seen from the SUBCA T list in (35b), the only local o-commander of the embedded anaphor is the PP from Max, which is incorrec tly predicted to be its only possible binder .12
A potentially salvaging move would be to posit a null pronoun on the SUBCA T list of promise corresponding to the unexpressed controlling argument. There is some evidence however that the unexpressed arguments of such nominals are not null pronouns. In F81Tell (1992) it is argued that the complements of certain nouns in English, notably nouns such as owner, builder, and composer, may be realized as null pronouns (as in This Iwuse; is being sold by the owner proi.) The two cases contrast in two significant ways, as can be seen from the fo llowing examples. 13 (36) a. ? Which housei did the owner proi put up ti for sale?
b. You know the housei that I asked you if you remembered who the owner pro; was? (37) a.
Which child; would a promise 0i (from Max) to be allowed to watch TV be a surprise to ti? b. * You know the childi that I asked you if you remembered when you overheard the promise 0; (from Max) to be allowed to watch TV?
(36a) shows that the null complement of owner gives rise to the so-called weak. crossover effect, just as overt pronouns do (Koopman & Sportiche 1982) . The same effect is not fo und with the implicit argument of promise in (37a). (36b) shows that the null complement of owner, like overt pronouns in general. can func tion as a resumptive pronoun in a relative clause structure in which the relativized position is within an island. The implicit argument of promise. on the other hand cann ot, as shown by (37b). These differences are readily explained only if the ar guments of promise cannot be null pronouns, in which case (35a) remains a prob lem for S&P. CS:
The claim of interest here is that the recipient argument -being affected as the ben eficiary of the action -is the second argument of AFFE CI' on the action tier in the CS, which, as noted by Iackendoff and Pinker, accounts for various well known syntactic and semantic differences between the double object and NP [to NP] uses of members of this class of predicates. Now, given this analysis of double object predicates and the above observations concerning promise. it is reasonable to as sume a lexical entry such as the fo llowing for transfer of possession promise.
(4 1) AS :
cs:
The stage is now set for an explanation for the kind of controller shift ill us trated by (38a). Double object/transfer of possession promise optionally allows its theme argument ([z] in the CS in (4 1» to be realized by an in:f mitival phrase ex pressing subject potentiation, presumably by vinue of the fact that such a phrase has essentially the same meaning as the sort of NP headed by permission in (38b). Put differently. by analogy with (38b), the promise of (38a) may have the concep tual structure in (4 1), rather than that normally associated with it when it takes a controlled complement (see §2 above). Crucially, in the CS in (41), the addressee is also a kind of influenced. participant, i.e., the beneficiary of the transfer of posses sion, which is represented. by showing this argument to be the same as the second argument of AFFE CI' on the embedded action tier. The net result is that the ad dressee/i nfluenced argument (the obj ect in an active clause) is chosen as controller by control principle (8b), which requires that if there is an action tier in the CS of the governing predicate, the second (or influenced.) argument of AFFE cr be chosen. The possibility of subject/actor control in the cases in question is due to the optionality of the transfer of possession construal. That is, the analysis of promise sketched in §2 is also available for (38a).
On this analysis, then, what is exceptional about the controller shift construc tion is simply that the controlled complement realizes the theme argument of transfer of possession promise, which is otherwise restricted to the double object (or NP NP) construction. That the controller 'shifts' under these circumstances follows from the general principles governing control. Since this analysis is keyed to con ceptual structure rather than syntactic configurations, it should be clear that it ex· tends unproblemadcall y to cases of control with nominal promise, as in (35a). thus avoiding one serious problem with the S&P analysis of controller ShifL The pr0-posed analysis also sheds some light on why controller shift is restricted. to cases where the infinitival complement expresses subject potentiation. since the meaning of this type of phrase (being essentially the same as that of an NP headed by permission) is such that it can be conceived. of as undergoing a transfer of posses sion, in some abstract sense.
Independent evidence for the claim that the promise of the controller shift construction is transfer of possession promise comes from examples such as the fo llowing, which show that control-shifted promise, unlike subject/actor control promise, can be used in a context that forces the controlled complement to be con strued as an entity capable of undergoing a transfer of possession.
(42) The kids will get what Ij promised thetlli , which was a. permissi on to watch TV b.
f6i to be allowed to watch TV c. * �j towatch TV (42b) is presumably acceptable because being allowed to watch TV, like permission to watch TV, is something that can be gotten (and thus possessed) and the promise of (42b) denotes an event involving expressed committnent to a transfer of posses sion of the content of the controlled complement. (42c), on the other hand, is pre sumably unacceptable because subject/actor control promise does Qot denote an event in which there is committnent to a transfer of possession; the addre ssee is not understood. as being the intended recipient of the content of the controlled comple ment.
Summari zing, the lexical semantic approach to complement control laid out in §2 makes available reasonable analyses of Visser's generalization and the controller shift problem without appealing to any notion of syntactic command. This is a wel-
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come result insofar as a syntactic binding constraint formulated in terms of o-command not only provides inadequate solutions to these problems but is inde pendently of questionable viability.
s. Conclusion
There are several respects in which the 'binding' of complement control (in English at least) differs from that of reflexive anaphora. In particular, only the for mer phenomenon has the following features:
• The bindee cannot be overt.
• The binder cannot be a suppressed argument
• the binder must be a specific semantic argument of a governing predicate. It is clear that the principles governing control must be at least partiall y distinct from those governing reflexive anaphora. This conclusion does not preclude the possi· bility that there might be some overlap in the two sets of principles. This paper has shown. however, that there are good reasons not to impose on complement control the syntactic local command constraints of GB and HPSG theories of reflexive anaphora, and that the principles governing control are optimall y formulated in terms of the constructs of argument structure and conceptual structure.
